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I
I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GERALD E. HULBERT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16197

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent Gerald E. Hulbert brought the present action
to recover attorneys fees and court costs incurred in his
successful defense of a series of grand jury indictments,
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30a-l-3

(Supp. 1977).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a non-jury trial in the District Court, the
Honorable Christine M. Durham granted judgment for the
plaintiff-respondent in the amount of $62,384.99.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the present appeal be dismissed
or denied and the judgment of the lower court affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent adopts the Findings of Fact as they were
entered by the court below (R. 109-113) and as set forth in
appellant's brief.

The undisputed facts can be summarized as

follows:
In 1975, a Utah State Grand Jury over a period of
several months issued 12 indictments against Gerald E. Hulbert
for alleged acts and/or omissions committed by him in his
capacity as Chairman and Director of the Utah State Liquor
Control Commission.
Rawlings~

Mr. Hulbert retained the law firm of

Roberts & Black to represent him in the defense of

said indictments.

During the ensuing two and one-half years

that firm spent over 500 hours, made 65 court appearances,
conducted two trials, and two appeals in the defense of
Mr. Hulbert.

The result was that Mr. Hulbert was exonerated

on all 12 indictments.
In 1977, the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code Annotated
§63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977), which reads as follows:
If a state grand jury indicts an officer
or employee in connection with or arising
out of any act or omission of that officer
or employee during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of his employment
or under color of his authority, and that
indictment is quashed or dismissed or
results in a judgment of acquittal, unless
the indictment is quashed or dismissed upon
appljcation or motion of the prosecuting
attorney, that officer or employee shall
be entitled to recover from the state the
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs
necessarily incurred in the defense of
that indictment.
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A retroactive provision of the statute made it applicable
to Mr. Hulbert's claim for reasonable attorney's fees.
Pursuant to said statute, Mr. Hulbert submitted to the
Honorable Scott M. Matheson, the Honorable David

s.

Monson

and the Honorable Robert B. Hansen a claim for attorney's fees
and costs, itemizing and substantiating by affidavit a total
sum of $77,815.65.

After the statutory 90-day period had

elapsed without response from the State of Utah, and pursuant
to the procedures outlined in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-1, et seq., {Supp. 1965), Mr. Hulbert

filed an action against the State of Utah in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, pursuant
to the above referenced Utah statute for reimbursement for
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

Said case was tried

commencing on the 30th day of October, 1978, before the
Honorable Christine M. Durham, District Judge, without a jury.
Thereafter, on the 8th day of November, 1978, Judge Durham filed
and entered a Memorandum Decision followed by a judgment in
favor of Mr. Hulbert, entering findings that the reasonable
fees and costs necessarily incurred by Mr. Hulbert in the defense
of said grand jury indictments was the sum of $62,384.99.
At the time of trial, Mr. Hulbert testitied that his initial
agreement with the firm in May of 1975 after his first indictment
provided that he would pay $5,000.00 as a retainer, with an
additional $5,000.00 to be due if the matter came to trial and
$2,000.00 more if an appeal was taken.

{R. 143-44).

Additional

indictments were forthcoming, but there was no further discussion
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or agreement regarding fees for the firm's representation of

Mr. Hulbert in those matters until the fall of 1976, due to the
state of Mr. Hulbert's mental and physical health during the
course of the proceedings.

(R. 146-49)

In the fall of 1976, Mr. Hulbert approached Hr. Wayne
Black with regard to his additional fee obligation.

He

requested a bill because he needed it for his "own peace of
mind."

(R. 149)

He subsequently received a letter from

Mr. Wayne Black indicating that the firm would accept $18,500.00
as a total fee for representing Mr. Hulbert on the various
indictments.

(Exhibit 4-P)

Mr. Hulbert regarded this amount

as nominal and a mere gesture.

He felt indebted to the firm

and promised to pay a proper amount when he obtained the means.
(R. 153 and 324-26)
After the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-l, et seq.,
(Supp. 1977), an itemization of the work done by the firm was
compiled to assist Mr. Hulbert in presenting his claim for
attorney's fees to the State.

A claim for $77,815.65 was

presented to the members of the Board of Examiners.
Following the District Court trial, Mr. Hulbert amended
this claim by substituting the Court's judgment, thereby
reducing his original claim to the amount of the judgment,
i.e., $62,384.99.
After hearings before the Board of Examiners, Governor
Matheson voted to approve the modified claim, and Lieutenant
Governor David S. Bonson and Attorney General Robert B. Hansen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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voted to defer said claim based upon the representation of
Attorney General Robert B. Hansen that he intended to appeal
the judgment entered by Judge Durham and thus to await the
outcome of said appeal.
The notice to the legislature with regard to the action
taken by the Board of Examiners was submitted in a letter
dated December 8, 1978.

It made note of a specific recommendation

by the Board of Examiners and submitted the claim to the
legislature for further action.
The legislature, in H.B. 426, entitled Supplemental
Appropriations Act, appropriated $50,000 as settlement of the
claim of Mr. Hulbert.

H.B. 426 was signed into law by the

Governor of the State of Utah on March 16, 1979.
A warrant for payment of this appropriation has been
issued by the Department of Finance but is being withheld by
the Attorney General, who refuses to honor either the specific
appropriation of the legislature or the judgment rendered below.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
POINT I.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER

JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT.
The appellant is contending in this Court, as he did
below, that the power vested in the Board of Examiners by the
Constitution to examine all claims against the State deprives
the courts of jurisdiction to enter judgment on such claims.
Even a cursory reading of the constitutional provision in
question, however, reveals that no such limitation is embodied
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in its express terms.

Art. VII, §13 of the Utah Constitution

provides, in relevant part, that;
[The Governor, Attorney General and Secretary
of State] shall, also, constitute a Board of
Examiners, with power to examine all claims
against the State except salar~es or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform
such other duties as may be prescribed by
law; ana no claim against the State, except
for salaries and compensation of officers
fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the
Legislature without having been cons~dered
and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners.
(emphasis added)
The obvious intent of this section is to provide a
limitation on the disbursement of public funds by the legislature;
a limitation which has never been questioned by the respondent.
While the judgment rendered by the District Court necessarily had
to be submitted to the Board of Examiners as a condition
precedent to its satisfaction, such a restriction did not
affect the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear this
action and determine the state's liability under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30a-l et seq.

(Supp. 1977).

The narrow issue presented by the appellant's first point
has been previously decided by this Court.

In Campbell Bldg.

Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 424, 70 P.2d 857 (1937),
a case involving a suit against the Commission for damages and
for the balance due on a contract, this Court pointed out that
there is no provision in the Utah Constitution which prohibits
the legislature from waiving the immunity of the state, and held
that the legislature had effected just such a waiver with regard
to written contracts entered into by the State Road Commission.
In response to the Attorney General's contention that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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l

exclusive procedure for filing claims against the state was with
the Board of Examiners, the identical claim raised in this case,
the Court noted that any judgment obtained might have to be
presented to the Board of Examiners before the plaintiff could
receive payment, but stressed that the procedure for executing
on a judgment did not affect the jurisdiction of a Court in
rendering that judgment.
It is not now necessary for us to decide
whether the only method by which plaintiff
could satisfy any judgment it might obtain
would be by filing the claim evidenced
by the judgment with the Board of Examiners
and, in the event there was no appropriation
out of which it could be paid, to then go
to the Legislature for such appropriation.
How the judgment may be enforced, if one is
obtained, is quite another matter from the
problem for us to decide, which is, whether
plaintiff may proceed in the Courts to have
its claim liquidated.
(citations omitted)
70 P.2d at 861.

The Court held that the plaintiff could maintain

his action for liabilities arising out of a written contract,
because even though the state "may refuse to respond in damages
and leave a claimant without any remedy, as it may refuse to
pay its bonds, the obligation remains

70 P.2d at 862.

The respondent submits that this decision is dispositive of
the Attorney General's contention that Article VII, Sec. 13 of
the Utah Constitution is a direct limitation on the jurisdiction
of Courts to hear claims and enter judgments against the State.
The appellant's conclusion is a product of the failure to
recognize the vital distinction, highlighted by the Court in
Campbell, supra, between the two separate procedures of
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obtaining a judgment on the one hand and successfully satisfying
that judgment on the other.

It is fundamental that any judgment

entered against the State is not self-executing, and Article VII,
§ 13,

is a limitation on how such a judgment can be satisfied.

It.has no bearing on how it is obtained.
While the appellant has offered a voluminous authority to
show that the Board of Examiners has a broad and constitutionally
based power to review all claims against the State prior to the
legislature taking any action on such claims (a proposition with
which the plaintiff does not take issue), only the case of
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 143 P. 626

(1913), makes even

an oblique reference to the effect of the Board's power on the
jurisdiction of courts to hear claims against the State.

That

case, however, must be viewed in light of the conditions
prevailing when it was written.

Faced with a lower court decision

which had found liability on the part of the State and sequestered .
particular state funds out of which the judgment was to be
satisfied, the Court held that the State was immune from suit
and that even in a case where immunity had been waived, a court

~

II

could not designate how a judgment would be satisfied (if at

I

all).

The Court went on to note that although the State was
immune from suit, there was a procedure through which claims
against the State could be heard, namely by filing claims with
the Board of Examiners.

The Court highlighted this procedure

to show that the State "[has] not arbitrarily, as they might
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1.

I

have done, shielded the State from being sued in the courts,
but they did so for good and sufficient reason."

134 P. at 631.
~eason

So by way of dicta, the court suggested that there was no

for the State to consent to being sued in the courts because a
constitutional framework already existed for bringing claims
against the State.

The language suggesting a jurisdictional

limitation, therefore, represents a judicial justification for
adhering to the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Now

that the doctrine has lost its vitality by express decree of the
legislature, the historical rationalization for its existence
need not .detain this court.

The most that can be said of the

Wilkinson decision is that it contained some language implying
that there was a limitation on court jurisdiction contained in
Article VII, Sec. 13.

Clearly, any such implication was directly

renounced twenty years later in Campbell, supra.

Yet the

Wilkinson case is the only authority offered by the appellant
which even inferentially supports the argument that the District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear a claim against the State.
The remainder of the cases cited by appellant stand collectively
for the proposition that the Legislature cannot pay claims which
have not been first reviewed by the Board.

This proposition is

both unassailable and irrelevant to the issue at bar.

Those

cases mandate the procedure to be followed after judgment is
obtained, but have no bearing on the question of the jurisdiction
of courts to render a judgment.
Mr. Hulbert filed this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977), which provides for attorney's fees
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and court costs necessarily incurred in the successful defense
of grand jury indictments.
Section 3 of the same act specifies that:
[t]his act shall apply to claims arising
prior to the effective date of this
act so long as those claims are filed in
the manner provided in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act and within two years after the
cause of action arises.
(emphasis added)
It is the respondent's contention that this reference to
the procedures outlined in the Governmental Immunity Act was
intended by the legislature to incorporate not only the provision
regarding notice, but all of the procedures set forth in the
ImmunityAct for processing claims against the State.

Those

procedures are as follows:
Any person having a claim for any injury to
person or property against a governmental
entity or its employee may petition said entity
for any appropriate relief including the award
of money damages. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11
(Supp. 1965)
A claim against the state or any agency thereof
as defined herein shall be forever barred
unless notice thereof is filed with the
attorney general of the State of Utah and the
agency concerned within one year after the
cause of action arises.
Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-12 (Supp. 1965)
If the claim is denied, a claimant may
institute an action in the district court
against the governmental entity in those
circumstances where immunity from suit has
been waived as in this act provided.
Said
action must be commenced within one year after
denial or the denial period as specified
herein. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 (Supp. 1965)
The district courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over any action brought under this
act and such actions shall be governed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as
they are consistent with this act.
Utah Code
Ann.
Sponsored by the S.J.
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That it was the intent of the legislature to incorporate
by reference all of the procedural aspects of the Immunity Act
is clearly shown by the title of the Act under which the
respondent claims, which recites the purposes of the bill as
follows:
An act relating to governmental affairs;
providing for the reimbursement to officers
and employees of the state of legal fees and
costs necessarily incurred in the successful
defense of grand jury indictments; defining
terms; and providing that the act shall
apply to all claims submitted with~n the
t~me l~m~ts and ~n the manner prov~ded ~n
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Laws of
Utah 1977, ch. 245.
(emphas~s added)
The reference in section 63-30a-3 to filing claims "in
the [same] manner" as is done under the Immunity Act has to
include the procedures outlined in the Immunity Act for following
the claims through to judgment if they are initially denied or
ignored by the State.

Otherwise the Act would be superfluous

and without effect.
As we have seen, the appellant's only objection to accepting
this procedure is that the Attorney General feels it would
operate as an unconstitutional circumvention of the Board of
Examiners.

Yet, under the Immunity Act itself, the district
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courts of the state are given exclusive jurisdiction to
entertain actions against the state when a claim has been
duly made upon the state and subsequently denied or ignored.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 & 16 (Supp. 1965).

This jurisdiction

is granted without regard to whether the legislature has made
appropriations for payment of that claim.

Utah Code Ann.

§63-30-23 (Supp. 1965) provides the procedure to be followed
when no appropriation is available, including submission of the
judgment to the Board of Examiners.
The clear effect of this last provision is to insure that
there is no conflict with Art. VII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution.
~fuile

this procedure may be somewhat cumbersome, it is

constitutional.

As one writer has noted:

Article 7, Section 13, of the Utah
Constitution provides that "a Board of
Examiners • . . [shall have] power to
examine all claims against the State."
The Utah Supreme Court has given this
provision a literal interpretation, thus
granting the board almost unlimited power
to make recommendations concerning the
ultimate disposition of "claims" against
the state.
This power encompassed tort
claims against the state prior to the
Immunity Act and required that such
claims be submitted to the board.
The
claims, together with recommendations
from the board, were then passed upon by
the legislature, generally in conformity
with the board's recommendations.
In analyzing the court's broad interpretation of the power of the board in
relation to the language of Section 23
of the Immunity Act, there appears
to be an incongruous procedural system,
which it has been argued, might make
the Immunity Act unconstitutional by
bypassing the board.
Further consideration,
however, would seem to indicate two ways
in which any constitutional difficulties
could be obviated.
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First, section 23 of the Immunity Act
provides that a "claim approved by the
state • • • or any final judgment
obtained against the state shall be
presented • • • for payment if payment
• • • is otherwise permitted by law."
If payment if not authorized by law,
then the claim must be "presented to
the board of examiners • • • " It seems
clear that if an approved claim or
judgment cannot be satisfied under the
constitution until it has been acted upon
by the board of examiners, then no
approved claim or judgment would be
"otherwise permitted by law" within the
meaning of the Immunity Act. Thus,
even though all approved claims and
judgments may have to be routed through
the board of examiners, at the risk of
delay in satisfaction by the board or
by the legislature, the statute can
easily be construed to be consistent with
the constitution.
Note: The Utah Governmental Immunity Act:
An Analys~s. 1967 Utah L. Review 120.
This statutory scheme vests jurisdiction in the district
courts for all claims filed and denied under the provisions of
the Immunity Act.

It also makes it clear that the legislature

envisioned the possibility of judgments being rendered which
would have to be submitted to the Board of Examiners before
they could be paid.

The appellant has asserted that this

section of the Immunity Act is unconstitutional because:
(1) The constitutional and statutory
powers of the board of examiners would
thereby be reduced to a mere auditing;
and (2) The constitutional power of the
legislature to make appropriations of
public funds would be usurped by the
courts.
Both of these arguments are at odds with the facts.

The

section does not even imply any attempted direction to the Examiners
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on how they should evaluate and vote on judgments obtained
pursuant to the Act.

The Examiners are left absolutely free

to recommend or not recommend the claims for payment.

T<fuile,

pragmatically, the court action would undoubtedly facilitate
a more expeditious review of the factual basis of any claim,
thereby relieving the Board of Examiners of a burdensome duty,
it is not suggested that the Board would be bound by any court
findings.

Certainly no usurpation of any legislative function

is involved because even claims approved by the examiners would
still have to be submitted to the legislature for payment,
and their decision to pay or not would be final and binding.
In short, granting jurisdiction to the courts to hear claims
against the state does not involve any conflict with Article VII,
Sec. 13, of the Constitution as long as the judgment rendered by
such a court is ultimately submitted to the Board prior to being
passed upon by the legislature.
The fundamental error that permeates the entire argument
of the appellant is the failure to recognize the distinction
between obtaining and satisfying a judgment.

The Attorney

General obfuscates the jurisdictional question with unnecessary
recitation of the powers of the Examiners, which the respondent
does not contest.

He fails, however, to come to grips with

the issue of a court's jurisdiction to hear claims against the
state.

The Supreme Court has resolved this issue in favor of

court jurisdiction in Campbell, supra, forty years before.
Respondent respectfully submits that this point on appeal
is without merit.
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POINT II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FULLY

SUPPORTS THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BELOW.
In considering the appellant's

c~ntion

that the

District Court judgment is not supported by the evidence, tbis
Court should bear in mind that the appellant has not challenged
the finding that $62,384.69 represents a reasonable amount for
fees and costs for the services provided in defending Mr. Hulbert,
but is only taking issue with the finding that such reasonable
fees and costs were "necessarily incurred" within the meaning
of Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977).

When stripped of its

recurrent diatribe regarding the plight of taxpayers, the
appellant's argument can be easily stated:

the fees and costs

awarded were not necessarily incurred because Mr. Hulbert's
counsel offered to accept less.

Such an argument fails to take

into account the plain meaning of the term "incurred" and the
most basic principles of law pertaining to fees "incurred" as
a result of attorney-client relationships.
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, made the
following observations concerning the fee arrangement in
Mr. Hulbert's prosecutions:
After the first group of indictments was
issued in May of 1975, the Black firm
suggested a $5,000 retainer in connection
with the research and preparation of
plaintiff's defense of the indictments,
which plaintiff paid. An additional
$5,000 was estimated for trial of the
matter if necessary, and $2,000 for
appeal.
A second and later a third set of
indictments were handed down in July
and August of 1975. Rawlings, Rober~s .
and Black continued to represent pla~nt~ff
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on all of the issued counts.
The matter
was vigorously prosecuted by special
attorneys general appointed by the State
and by the Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office, and the defense was protracted,
complicated, time-consuming and difficult.
Attendant publicity contributed to the
task of defense counsel. Plaintiff's
mental and physical health deteriorated,
and as a result, his counsel deferred any
discussion of fees. Plaintiff, however,
insisted on a billing in 1976, because
of his strong sense of personal and moral
obligation to pay for services rendered and
a desire to know where he stood vis-a-vis
the fee obligation.
In response to plaintiff's
urgent request, Black wrote a letter in
September of 1976, offering to consider
$18,500 the total fee, taking into account
the $8,500 actually paid prior to that date
by Hulbert. Plaintiff, although unemployed
and still ill, told Mr. Black that the fee
suggested in the September letter was token
in nature and unacceptable to him.
The two
subsequently agreed orally that plaintiff
would pay the law firm a reasonable and
fair fee "if and when" plaintiff became
able to do so
The testimony indicates that plaintiff
intended his obligation to be one for
reasonable fees at a then undetermined
level. H.r. Black apparently intended
that obligation to be contingent upon
plaintiff's future ability to pay, if
any.
(R. 98-99)
These findings are supported by both the testimony of
Mr. Wayne Black (R. 325) and Mr. Hulbert (R. 153).

The appellant

asserts, without acknowledging the conversation between Mr. Black
and Mr. Hulbert subsequent to the letter of September 3 and
the note in response, that no court would enforce against a
client an agreement to pay more than he was informed would
be required for his attorney's service.
Appellant at page 37).

(See Brief of

This allegation, supported with
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no authority but the statement that it is "so patently
obvious as to defy reason" is directly contrary to this Court's
holding in Oliver v. Mitchell, 14 Utah 2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962).
In that case, Mr. Mitchell had been represented by D. H.
Oliver on a charge of first degree murder.

Oliver was appointed

as counsel by the trial court to handle the defense, as Mitcbell
was an indigent.

M~tchell,

who was fully entitled to representation

by Oliver without any obligation to pay him for his services
promised to pay his attorney "when he could" and wrote to
Mr. Oliver from prison after his conviction and renewed this
pledge.
While in prison, Mitchell began receiving payments as the
insurance beneficiary of his brother, who had been killed in
military service.

Mitchell informed Oliver of this fact and

told him he couldn't pay until he was released from prison.
Oliver brought an action to recover a fee for his services in
Mitchell's defense and garnished the insurance fund being
held by prison officials.
In upholding the trial court's award of fees to Oliver,
the Court, in an unanimous decision, indicated that
It is incontestable that plaintiff
performed a valuable service for whi~h
there is usually a charge, and of wh~ch
defendant freely availed himself without
dissent and, indeed, for which defendant
promised to pay. Granting the fact ~he
court appointed Mr. Oliver as an off~cer
of the court to act as defendant's counsel
as a public service, and that a criminal
defendant's right to counsel is absolute
regardless of his ability to pay; does
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this relieve the defendant of his
promise to pay when able? We know of
no rule or reason why this should be
held to convert into a mere moral
obligation.
Indigents are as legally
competent to contract as other men
and their procedural rights are the
same not greater. A promise to pay
his attorney is to the credit of an
indigent defendant for as yet in Utah
the court appointed defense attorney
receives no compensation by the county
or other public authority and he must
rely exclusively on the possible future
ability of his client to pay.
In a
majority of cases the client may never
be able to properly compensate his
attorney but this is no reason to
prevent an attorney from recovering
from one who can.
14 Utah 2d at 12.
There is no distinguishable difference between the above
cited case and the present action.

Mr. Hulbert, who could have

accepted Mr. Black's offer of a nominal charge for the firm's
services but promised to pay a reasonable value when able, stands
in the identical position of the indigent who promises to pay
when able though he otherwise would not be under obligation to
compensate his counsel.

In both cases the happening of a

subsequent event triggered the fee obligation (obtaining a
fund which made the client "able" to pay) and in both cases
the fees are enforceable as promised by the client.
Modifications of the original conditions and terms of
compensation due to attorneys from clients are not per se
unenforceable.

In Rudd v. Crown International, 26 Utah 2d 263,

488 P.2d 298 (1971), the Court was asked to review an award
of attorney's fees wherein counsel had originally indicated
his fee would be $35 per hour, but as the representation
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I

became more detailed and time-consuming, he changed his fee
to first $5,000 and then $10,000.

The Court upheld the

$10,000 award and indicated that the amount of the fee which
is reasonable isn't controlled by any set formula and the
judgment of the trial court in determining a reasonable fee
is presumed correct because of the advantaged position of the
judge to hear and determine the issues raised concerning
reasonableness of fees.

See also Wallace v. Build, Inc.,

16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965).
Mr. Hulbert, in seeking and receiving the assistance of
Rawlings, Roberts and Black in his defense on the indictments
filed subsequent to his original agreement with the firm,
obviously incurred an obligation for payment to the firm even
in the absence of an agreement so specifying.

It is axiomatic

that an individual who receives services at his own request is
under a duty implied in law to compensate the party providing
such services for their reasonable value in the absence of a
specific agreement as to the amount of compensation.

See

Trafton v. Youngblood, 69 Cal.2d 17, 442 P.2d 648 (1968);
Carter v. Wooley, 521 P.2d 793 (Okla. 1974).

This obligation

was incurred as the services were performed, and Mr. Hulbert's
subsequent promise to pay a reasonable fee when able is a
promise which is legally sufficient to bind him to an express
contract.

As stated in A. Corbin, Contracts §211 at 303-04

(1952)
A past debt, still existing and
enforceable, is a sufficient basis
for the enforcement of a new promise
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by the debtor to pay it. This is true,
whether the past debt is contractual
or quasi-contractual in character.
One who is already bound to pay for
services rendered at his request can
be sued upon his subsequent express
promise to pay for the debt.
Professor Corbin also notes that in the law of contracts
a subsequent promise to pay a debt previously owing is enforceable
even if there is a deficiency of some type in legal rights of the
creditor to collect on the previous debt.
This authority is simply cited to demonstrate that Judge
Durham's holding that Mr. Hulbert's promise to pay a reasonable
fee for the services rendered on his behalf was an enforceable
promise is on solid footing in the law of contracts.
The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that
Mr. Hulbert "necessarily incurred" the reasonable fees associated
with his defense by requesting and accepting the firm's
representation, and that his subsequent promise to pay that
reasonable amount constituted an agreement enforceable against
him, which therefore is enforceable against the State by virtue
of Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-2 (Supp. 1977).
The appellant has also challenged the validity of the
contract on the basis that it was made contingent upon
plaintiff's future ability to pay.

As demonstrated by the

Oliver decision, supra, this contingency doesn't affect the
validity or enforceability of the agreement if the fact upon
which future liability is premised (ability to pay) is realized.
1

In the appellant's words "[t]he uncertainty and iffiness' of
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any contract founded such a factual basis is so apparent to
require no further elucidation."

(Brief of Appellant at 41)

Again, the appellant's statement of the law, which is so
obvious as not to need supporting authority, is directly
contrary to the prevailing authority.

Prof. Corbin indicates

that
[W]hen one is contracting on the basis
of new consideration, he can limit his
duties as he sees fit. The same is true
where he is promising on the basis of a
"past consideration". • •
The new promise may be made conditional on
any new performance or event. Frequently,
a debtor promises to pay the debt as soon
as he is financially able to do so. This
makes his "ability" to pay a condition
precedent to a right of action; and it
must be alleged and proved by the creditor.
What constitutes ability to pay is indeed
a variable quantity; and often, in the
light of surrounding circumstances, a
promise so worded has been interpreted
as a promise to pay within a reasonable
time.
A. Corbin, Contracts §215 at 308-09 (1952).
Clearly, one of the most distinguished scholars in the
field would have some reservations about the Attorney General's
view of the law applicable to contingent obligations, and is
of the opinion that the promise to pay for past services
when "able" is both enforceable and routine.
There can be no question that the Legislature fulfilled
the condition which gave rise to Hr. Hulbert's duty to pay
and at the same time created his right to recover

that

liability from the State.
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The final objection of the appellant to the fee as found
by the lower court is that it represents a modification of the
attorney-client agreement after its initial formulation by the
parties and is therefore, he argues, presumptively invalid.
This argument is flawed in two respects.
First, Mr. Hulbert never had an express agreement with the
firm for their representation on the indictments subsequent to
May of 1975 and his liability for that service initially arose
by operation of law; that is, his obligation to pay for services
rendered on his behalf at their reasonable value is an agreement
implied by law.

Thus, his promise to do just that, pay a

reasonable attorney's fee, wasn't a modification of his earlier
contract, it was an expressed intention to fulfill the duty
previously implied.
Second, as the cases cited by appellant demonstrate, the
rule that agreements between clients and counsel altered during
the course of representation should be closely scrutinized by
the court is to protect against attorney's misusing the
confidences and influence he has with respect to his client's
affairs and to prevent over-reaching by counsel.

However, as

demonstrated by the Rudd v. Crown International decision, supra,
modifications are not presumptively invalid and, in the absence
of some objection by the client, the reasonableness of the fee
found at trial will not be overturned on appeal.
The cases cited by appellant, and the rationale implicit
to their holdings, are clearly inapplicable to a case such as
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1

this, where the client insists that his counsel's attempt
to modify the fee for the benefit of the client will not be
accepted.

The Oliver case, supra, is again enlightening on

this issue, as the Court there lauded the client for his
expressed promise to pay that which he otherwise wouldn't owe
and did not find any irregularity with his voluntary acceptance

-

of a greater obligation than required by the terms of his
initial attorney-client arrangement, even though his counsel
benefitted financially from that alteration.
An agreement to pay what one owes, despite personal
financia~

impediments which preclude actually ever being

judicially compelled to do so, is certainly not contrary to
public policy and is to be wholeheartedly supported.
It is a fundamental proposition that the findings of the
trial court will not be overturned on appeal if there is any
substantial evidence to support them, Sullivan v. Turner 22 Utah
2d 85, 451 P.2d 907 (1968), and that where a case is tried to
the court without a jury, evidence must be reviewed in the light
most favorable to sustain the findings of the court and the
judgment based upon such findings.

Lake Creek Irr. Co. v. Clyde,

22 Utah 2d 222, 451 P.2d 375 (1968); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d
133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962).

The appellant has not actually

attacked the factual determination of the court below (that
Mr. Hulbert agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fees, and that
Mr. Black agreed to accept the same, when Hulbert became able to
pay) , but has argued that the Conclusions of Law entered by the
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court don't flow from such findings.

The respondent submits

that the authority cited above shows conclusively that the
findings of the court support the conclusion that Mr. Hulbert
necessarily incurred $62,384.99 in reasonable attorney's fees
and court costs and that the arguments raised by appellant in
opposition to such a conclusion are contrary to decided case law
in this and other jurisdictions, the views of legal scholars
and not supported by the logic and reasoning of the appellant's
own authority.
POINT III.

UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30a-3 (SUPP. 1977) IS A

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID RETROACTIVITY CLAUSE CREATING A FINANCIAL
LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE STATE FOR A PREVIOUSLY INCURRED
MORAL OBLIGATION.
This Court has previously acknowledged that neither the
United States Constitution nor the Utah Constitution contain
any provision which by its express terms prohibits the
legislature from enacting measures which have retroactive
application.

Mecham v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 321,

410 P.2d 1008 (1966).

The Court further noted that the

legislature, in fact, could lawfully, enact measures which
have a reasonable retrospective application upon subjects
or actions occurring prior to the date of the convening of
that body.

See also Garrett Freightlines v. State Tax Comm'n,

103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523 (1943).

Indeed, while Utah has a

specific statute which provides that acts which do not expressly
indicate that they are to have retroactive effect will not be
construed to have such application, Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3
(1953)
, there is nothing in the organic law of the State which
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calls into question the validity of retroactive legislation.
The appellant concedes that Utah has no direct constitutional
prohibition regarding retroactive legislation, but asserts that
Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-3 (Supp. 1977) is unconstitutional because
it violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Art. I, §7 of the Utah Constitution.

This

argument is premised upon the contention that by creating a
liability on the part of the State for past actions the
legislature divested the State of a previously vested interest
in violation of constitutional restrictions on legislative
prerogative.
It can be quickly noted from a reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment that it is a restriction on the State's ability to
enact laws which have certain proscribed effects on individuals,
but doesn't speak at all to the power of a state to alter the
rights of the state itself.

The Amendment provides, in relevant

part, that
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, w~thout due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
(emphasis added)
Not surprisingly, given the absence of any directive to
the contrary, courts have universally recognized that a state
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legislature is free to modify, impair or eliminate the vested
right of the State itself and the constitutional limitations
on the legislature's actions only come into play when vested
rights of individuals are retroactively impaired.

The general

rule, as stated in 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §417 at 106
(1954), is as follows:
As long as private rights are not
infringed, the state may constitutionally
pass retrospective laws waiving or
impairing its own rights, or those of
its instrumental subdivisions or of the
public generally.
In Riesberg v. State, 243 N.Y.S.2d (Ct. of Claims 1963),
a New York court addressed the question of whether the enabling
act of certain legislation, which operated to give certain
injured parties a cause of action against the State for injuries
which were received prior to the date of the legislation and at
a time when the State had not yet waived its immunity with regard
to such claims, was unconstitutional as a retroactive impairment
of the State's vested rights and "special" or "private"
legislation for the benefit of specific people -- the exact
claim asserted by the appellant in this case.

The court held

that the statute was constitutional and stated:
While it has been said that, generally,
retrospective laws are unconstitutional
if they destroy or disturb existing or
vested rights, nevertheless the State may
constitutionally pass retrospective laws
waiving or impairing its own rights, and it
may impose upon itself new liabilities
with respect to transactions already past.
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A statute should be upheld as constitutional if it is possible to do so
without disregarding the plain command
or necessary implication of the
fundamental law.
The Legislature can recognize and
provide redress for the State's liability
for past obligations equally with its
right to waive its immunity for claims
to arise in the future.
243 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
This holding is consistent with all authority discovered
by the respondent.

In State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb, 467 S.W.2d

854 (Mo. 1971), the Missouri Supreme Court cited the applicable
rule with regard to an enactment affecting rights of the State.
The state may constitutionally pass a
retrospective law impairing its own
rights, and may impose new liabilities
with respect to transactions already
past on the state itself. or on the
governmental subdivisions thereof.
467 S.W.2d at 856.
This rule has such general acceptance that even states
which do have constitutional provisions forbidding retroactive
legislation interpret those restrictions not to apply to laws
which only affect the rights of the state.
Clark, 95

u.s.

644

In New Orleans v.

(1877), the United States Supreme Court

considered a case arising out of Louisiana where the plaintiff
was suing on a bond obligation he claimed was owed by a
municipality which had been annexed into New Orleans.

At

the time of such annexation, the Louisiana legislature had
enacted a measure specifically requiring New Orleans to pay off
the bonds.

Both the old municipality and the City of New Orleans
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contended that there was no lawful obligation to the plaintiff
and that the act imposing the burden of payment on New Orleans
was unconstitutional in light of the state's constitutional
limitation on retroactive legislation.

The Supreme Court

responded that
The Constitution of Louisiana of 1868,
which provides that no retroactive law
shall be passed, does not forbid such
legislation. A law requiring a municipal
corporation to pay a demand which is
without legal ob~igation, but which is
equitable and just in itself, being
founded upon a valuable consideration
received by the corporation, is not a
retroactive law, -- no more so than
an appropriation act provid~ng for the
payment of a pre-ex~sting claim. The
const~tutional ~nh~bition does not apply
to legislation recognizing or affirming
the binding obligation of the State,
or of any of its subordinate agencies,
with respect to past transactions.
It
is designed to prevent retrospective
legislation injuriously affecting
individuals, and thus protect vested
rights from invasion.
(emphasis added)
95 U.S. at 655.
This same holding was reached in Graham Paper Co. v.
Gehner, 59 S.'i'7.2d 49 (Ho. 1933), where the court found that
"the provision of the [Missouri] Constitution inhibiting laws
retrospective in their operation is for the protection of
the citizen and not the state."

59 S.W.2d at 51.

See also,

State Highway Dep't. v. Bass, 29 S.E.2d 161 (Ga. 1944);
Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576

(1941);

Henry v. McKay, 3 P.2d 145 (Hash. 1931); 16 Am.Jur.2d,
Constitutional Law §418 at 758

(1964)

("A state may constitu-

tionally pass a retroactive law 1"hich impairs its own rights.")
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Simply asserting the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment doesn't strengthen the appellant's argument, as
the United States Supreme Court since the turn of the century
has clearly noted that "the mere fact that a statute is
retroactive in its operation does not make it repugnant to
the Federal Constitution."

League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156

(1901).
Appellant's cited authority does not address the State's
waiver of its own "vested rights" and is therefore wholly
inapposite to the issue presented by the facts of this case.
Equally unsuited to his argument are the appellant's own
citations indicating that a state legislature may constitutionally
give legal effect to previously existing moral obligations (see
Brief of Appellant at 48), which actually supports the
respondent's position.

Though the Attorney General argues that

Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-l, et seq.

(Supp. 1977) wasn't intended

as a legal remedy for a moral obligation, the respondent
submits that it is manifest that such was the precise and
only purpose of the Act.

It was intended to extinguish the

financial obligations incurred by a public official indicted
for acts occurring in the performance of government duties,
obligations incurred in successfully resisting the efforts
of the State to punish him for acts committed while in the
service of the State.

It represents an acknowledgment that

having to resist the vast resources of the State in defending
a criminal prosecution is an onnerous task, the cost of
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which should not, morally, fall upon the public servant who
is ultimately exonerated of the charges.
The Act's limitation to public officials is certainly
understandable and rational in view of the· greater exposure
they face due to their high visability, the constant public
pressure to eradicate government waste and abuse of power -be it real or imagined -- and the distinct groups of criminal
charges to which only public officials are subject.

There

can be no doubt the legislation was designed to remedy a
moral wrong previously visited upon the respondent and others
by the forces of the State and to insure protection for others
similarly wronged in the future.

As such, it is clearly

constitutional legislation as demonstrated by appellant's own
authority.
Additionally, the appellant asserts that because
Mr. Hulbert was active in lobbying for passage of the bill
and that it inurred to his personal benefit, it is unconstitutional "private" legislation in violation of Article VI, §26
of the State Constitution.

That section provides that "[n]o

private or special law shall be enacted where a general law
can be applicable."

The force of this argument is severely

undercut by the recognition that all liabilities acknowledged
for past obligations relate to particular and defined individuals,
sometimes to single individuals not a member of any class, but
that the acknowledgment and payment of these liabilities,
often on the express recommendation of the Board of Examiners,
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is not constitutionally invalid because the legislature has
the inherent power to pay claims of citizens, or provide a
means for payment, by admitting its obligation either through
direct compensation for a particular claim or by creation of
a cause of action against the state for individuals who share
a common species of claim.
In the instant case, Mr. Hulbert is a member of a defined
class given a cause of action by legislative

enactment~

he

was not, however, given an action not available to others
similarly situated and his entitlement did not result in any
prejudice to the rights of other individuals or class of
individuals of the State.

Under the test set forth in State

v. Kallas, 97 U. 492, 94 P.2d 414 (1939), such legislation
is general.

The definitions set forth there are as follows:

Laws which apply to and operate uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons,
places, or things requiring legislation
peculiar to themselves in the matters
covered by the laws in question, are
general and not special • .
Special legislation is such as relates
either to particular persons, places,
or things, or to persons, places, or
things which, though not particularized,
are separated by any method of selection
from the whole class to which the law
might, but for such legislation, be
applied, while a local law is one whose
operation is confined within territorial
limits, other than those of the whole
state or any properly constituted class
of locality therein.
94 P.2d at 420.

See also, Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277,
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480 P.2d 467

(1971)~

214, 129 P.2d 881

Unterrnyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah

(1947)~

Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah

Ins. Guarranty Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977).
In the latter case, this Court began its discussion of
the issue of what constitutes special legislation by acknowledging!
that the Supreme Court "makes every reasonable presumption in
favor of constitutionality and will not nullify a legislative
enactment unless it is clearly and expressly prohibited by
the Constitution."

564 P.2d at 753.

The Court then acknowledged

the definitions set forth in Kallas, supra, and quoted with
approval -the definition of special legislation contained in
People v. Western Fruit Growers, 22 Cal. 2d 494, 140 P.2d 13
(1943), indicating that a law
is special legislation if it confers
particular privileges or imposes peculiar
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in
the exercise of a common right~ upon a
class of persons arbitrarily selected,
from the general body of those who stand
in precisely the same relation to the
subject of the law.
The constitutional
prohibition of special legislation does
not preclude legislative classification,
but only requires the classification to
be reasonable.
140 P.2d at 19-20.
In Utah Farm Bureau, supra, this Court found that the
Utah Insurance Guaranty Association Act created a public
corporation designed to fill a public need and to promote the
public welfare by aiding citizens who might otherwise innocently
fail to have required insurance due to the insolvency of their
insurers.

The Act, and the corporation it created, was intended
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to effectuate the detection and prevention of insolvency on
the part of insurers and to accomplish this purpose all insurers
operating in the state, with certain defined exceptions, were
required to become members of the Association and contribute
an assessment to its operation.

The Court held the creation

of such a corporation to be founded upon a reasonable classification, equally applied to all insurers falling within the
defined class, and that the subject matter of the Act making
such a classification was a proper area for legislative action.
The Court, therefore, upheld the Act as constitutional general
legislation.
The reasoning cited in support of the Utah Farm Bureau
holding is equally relevant and controlling in the case at bar.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30a-l, et seq. (Supp. 1977) provides that a
particular class of individuals (officers or employees of the
state or its political subdivisions) with an entitlement to
recover fees and costs incurred in the successful defense of
grand jury indictments.

This entitlement is arguably a

"privilege" conferred upon the class defined, but it is
expressly made available to all members of the class

so

the first test for a general law set forth in Kallas, supra,
(uniform application to members of the class) is met.

The

remaining test (reasonableness of the class as a subject of
legislative enactment) requires simply that there be a rational
basis for conferring such a "privilege" on public employees
without extending the benefits to all citizens of the State.
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In testing the Act against this standard, the Court should
take cognisance of the rule acknowledged by the courts of
several other jurisdictions; namely, that the appropriate test
to apply on review is substantially the same as employed in
evaluating whether legislation is violative of the Equal
Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment if a suspect classification
isn't involved.

See, e.g., State v. Lewis 559 P.2d 630 (Alaska

1977); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (1977); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).

That test, as

articulated in State v. Mason, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 213 (1955)
provides that
A classification is never unreasonable
or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion
features so long as there is some basis for
the differentiation between classes or
subject matters included as compared to
those excluded from its operation, provided
the differentiation bears a reasonable
relation to the purposes to be accomplished
by the act.
In order to see whether the excluded
classes or transactions are on a different
basis than those included, we must look
at the purpose of the act.
The objects
and purposes of a law present the touchstone for determining proper and improper
classifications.
It is only where some persons or
transactions excluded from the operation
of the law are as to the subject matter
of the law in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation
that the law is discriminatory in the
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional.
If a reasonable basis to
differentiate those included from those
excluded from its operation can be found,
it must be held constitutional.
283 P.2d at 215.
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The Act in question doesn't contain an expression by
the legislature of its purpose, but respondent submits that
it cannot be doubted that the purpose of the legislation was
to relieve public officials and government employees of
financial obligations incurred in successfully defending
themselves on grand jury indictments arising out of the
performance of their duties on behalf of their employer.
The reasonable basis for limiting this attorney's fee
provision to officers and employees of a public entity, and
not awarding such an entitlement to all citizens who successfully
defend grand jury indictments, can be determined with minimal
effort if examination is made of the history of grand jury
prosecutions in this state, coupled with a recognition of
the greatly expanded criminal sanctions to which a public official
is subject and the State's legitimate interest in providing
assurance to public employees that working for the government
will not expose them to exaggerated risks of financial insecurity
without regard to the culpability of their conduct in the
performance of their duties.
Utah Code Ann. §77-19-7 (1953) sets forth the statutory
duties of the grand jury.

It provides that

The grand jury must inquire into the
case of every person imprisoned in the
jails of the county on a criminal charge
and not indicted or informed against;
into the conditions and management of
the public prisons within the county;
and into the wilful and corrupt misconduct
in the office of public officers of every
description within the county.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under modern rules of criminal procedure$, as shaped
by the vast constitutional protections afforded to arrestees,
including rights to speedy trial, prompt arraignment and
preliminary hearing, the grand jury's duty to incarcerated
individuals, charged but not informed against, is now merely
a vestige of earlier procedure not accompanied by actual responsibilities.

Almost exclusively, therefore, the duty of a grand

jury is to investigate public officials.
A brief examination of Title 76, Chapter 8 of the Utah
Criminal Code reveals that Parts 1 (corrupt practices), 2
(abuse of office), and about half of 4 (offenses against
public property) of the chapter define and describe offenses
applicable almost exclusively to public officials.

Given

this maze of possible offenses and an investigatory body with
no real duty to investigate anything else, public employees
stand a markedly greater chance of being inducted than other
citizens.

Combined with the attendant publicity normally

surrounding the prosecution of a public servant, the spectre
of grand jury indictment looms as a greater "occupational
hazard" for present and prospective public employees than
most callings and entirely justifies the State in recognizing
this fact legislatively and providing the class with a remedial
"privilege".
The foregoing demonstrates that the Act in question makes
a classification which has a rational relation to the purposes
to be accomplished by the legisaltion and that it applies
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equally to all members of the class.

Under the established

law of this state such an act is constitutional and not
violative of Art. VI, §26 of the State's Constitution.

As

stated in 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction §40.18 at 219
(4th Ed.)
Acts conferring franchises, privileges,
and immunities are general and not
special legislation unless there is
an arbitrary standard imposed as to
those who may avail themselves of the
privileges.
No such arbitrary standard is imposed by this Act, which
was largely patterned after a previously enacted measure designed
to insulate public officials from the financial hazards associated
with possible civil liability and legal expenses which might
be incurred by public employees.
et seq.

See Utah Code Ann. §63-48-1

(2d Rep. Vol. 1978).

The appellant's assertion that the retroactivity provision
of the Act alters the measure into "private" legislation is without
support.

It has been previously demonstrated that there is no

constitutional objection to retroactive legislation in a case
such as this, so the mere fact that valid class legislation is
coupled with a valid retroactive provision doesn't work any
transformation regarding the constitutionality of the statute.
Both components are valid and their combination is as well.
Riesberg v. State, supra.

See

Appellant has presented no authority

to the contrary.
Finally, it must be noted that Art. VI, §26 of the
Constitution doesn't prohibit all special legislation, but
only in cases "where a general law can be applicable".

Even
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if this Court were to determine that the Reimbursement of Legal
Fees Act constituted special legislation, there would be no
abridgment of any privileges or immunities of an individual by
the Act, so no Fourteenth Amendment problem would arise, and if
the Act is intended to benefit only Mr. Hulbert for his unique
travails, then no general law would be applicable and there
would still be no constitutional problem.

By saying no special

legislation is permissable where a general law is applicable,
the Constitution impliedly acknowledges that there will be
cases where special laws can be enacted because general laws
aren't applicable.

This is precisely why the legislature can

make payments to individuals after the Board of Examiners reviews
claims against the state and makes its recommendations.

Such

allocations are a species of equitable compensation made on
particular facts applicable only to the claimant.

Courts of

other jurisdictions have frequently acknowledged that the
legislature may consider moral obligations as sufficient
justification for the appropriation of state monies to
individuals (see Annot. 172 A.L.R. 1407), and Utah has
considered such appropriations at every legislative session
since the time of statehood.
359, 374 P.2d 516

(1962).

See Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d

Whether or not attorney's fees

have previously been the subject of such claims is totally
irrelevant.

The legislature has the constitutional power

to recognize the obligation and pay the claim individually
by appropriation if it is a singular claim, or enact a general
law giving relief to the whole class to whom they feel the
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State is so obligated.

The ironic fact of this case is that

while they have done both, the State's highest legal officer
refuses to accept their right to do either.

Such a refusal

is without support in the law.
POINT IV.

THIS APPEAL PRESENTS NO JUSTICIABLE CLAIM AND

THE ISSUES RAISED ARE MOOT.
Throughout the course of Mr. Hulbert's attempt to recover
on his claim, the Attorney General has insisted that any such
claim would have to be submitted to the Board of Examiners.
~1r.

Hulbert, after proceeding through the court system in the

manner indicated in the Act, did exactly that.

He submitted

the judgment to the Board, who voted 2-1 to recommend to the
legislature that the claim not be paid, pending appeal by the
State of the judgment.

The legislature, despite this recom-

mendation, appropriated $50,000 for full payment of Mr. Hulbert's
claim.
There is no dispute that Mr. Hulbert did submit the claim
and that the Board issued a recommendation, but the Attorney
General is now apparently contending that this action did not
constitute having the claim "acted upon" within the meaning
of Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution.

Plaintiff-

Respondent believes that such an assertion is clearly refuted
by the Board's own description of their conduct, but would
further indicate to the Court that, by statute, the Board of
Examiners cannot take "no action" on a claim, but must make
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a recommendation to the Legislature.

Utah Code Ann. §63-6-13

(1953) provides, in relevant part, that:
The board must at the time designated
proceed to-exaffiine and adjust all such
claims referred to in section (63-6-11)
of this act, and may hear evidence in
support of or against them, and shall
report to the legislature such facts
and recommendations concerning them as
it may think proper.
(emphasis added)
This is supplemented by the next section of the act,
which provides:
The board must make up its report and
recommendat~ons at least thirty days
before the meeting of the legislature;
and a brief abstract of the report,
showing the claims rejected, and those
allowed and the amounts thereof, must
be published in a newspaper published
at the seat of government before the
meeting of the legislature for such time
as the board may prescribe.
(emphasis
added)
Utah Code Ann. §63-6-14 (1953)
No option is provided for "not acting", and the recommendation
deemed appropriate by the Board is the action which a claiMant
may appeal to the Legislature, if he is aggrieved by such
action, as provided in Utah Code Ann. §63-6-17 (1953).
Hr. Hulbert took such an appeal to the Legislature and
they disregarded the recommendation of the Board and appropriated
$50,000 for settlement of the claim.

There is absolutely no

question that the Legislature can make such an appropriation
despite a different recorrunendation by the Board.
Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516

In Wood v.

(1962), this Court took

note of the Legislature's authority to do so.
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The provision of Sec. 13 of Art.
VII, quoted above, that, "* * * no
claim * * * shall be passed upon by
the Legislature without having been
considered and acted upon by the said
Board of Examiners" plainly indicates
that the action of the Board was not
intended to be so final and basolute
as to preclude other action by the
Legislature. We can perceive no other
meaning then that after the Board has
performed its duty of examining and
acting upon such claims, the Legislature
may thei). "pass upon", i.e., exercise its
judgment, on them and take such action
as it deems appropriate • • • To decide
otherwise would produce the illogical
result of turning the subsequent
presentation of claims to the Legislature
into an empty gesture whose only purpose
would be to rubber-stamp the action of
the Board.
13 Utah 2d at 362.
The Budge case involved review of the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel the Attorney General to make payments
to claimants to whom the legislature had appropriated money
despite the Board of Examiners' recommendation that such claims
be denied.

This Court held that the Order compelling payment

was properly entered and offered the following admonition
concerning the appropriate relationship between the executive
officers who comprise the Board of Examiners and the Legislature.
It is also pertinent to observe that
if one of the executive officers
constituting the Board could circumvent
legislative action by refusing to pay
out funds appropriated to pay such a
claim, problems would arise in determining how far actions of that character
could extend; and may well result in
perplexities reiating to the balance
of power between the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of our state government.
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These departments, though to a degree
interrelated and cooperating in the
overall functions of government, have
separate powers which should be safeguarded in order to preserve this
balance which has always been recognized
to be one of the advantages of our system.
In case of doubt or uncertainty on a
problem such as here exists, we think it
wise and desirable to adopt an interpretation
of the law and to follow a policy which will
fit harmoniously into and sustain that
balance rather than to choose an alternative
which would provide a foundation for disrupting
it.
13 Utah 2d at 362-63.
This Court further noted that the power of the Legislature
to settle claims was unquestionable and not restricted by the
powers granted to the Board of Examiners.
Our Legislature is directly representative
of the people of the sovereign state, and
thus has inherently all of the powers of
government except as otherwise specified
by the State Constitution.
By way of
comparison, it is significantly different
in that respect from the federal government,
which is a government of limited powers
that can properly do only those things
within the scope of the powers expressly
granted to it by the states through the
Federal Constitution; whereas, the State
Legislature, having the residuum of
governmental power, does not look to the
State Constitution for the grant of its
powers, but that Constitution only sets
forth the limitations on its authority.
Therefore, it can do any act or perform
any funct~on of government not spec~f~cally
prohibited by the State Constitution.
In
order to justify a conclusion that the
power to approve and pay such claims has
been taken away from the Legislature and
placed exclusively within the control
of the Board of Examiners, it would have
to clearly so appear, which is not the
case here.
13 Utah 2d at 363.
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The Court indicated that the only restriction on the
Legislature's power was some showing of the legitimacy of the
claim.

"In order to justify approval and payment there must

be at least some semblance of a valid claim. •
at 363.

II

13 Utah 2d

This requirement is clearly satisfied in the instant

case because Mr. Hulbert's claim, arising by statute, has been
the subject of a full trial on the merits resulting in a
judgment in his favor.
The Legislature having acted to pay the claim, and
Mr. Hulbert having agreed to the terms of that payment, there
is nothing left for this Court to resolve on appeal.

The

Attorney General's refusal to comply with the mandate of the
Legislature is not justified under the clearly established law
of this State.
The Attorney General's posture in this regard is most
baffling.

He resisted the court action by saying the Board

of Examiners - Legislature route was, constitutionally, the
only acceptable course for presenting the claim.

After the

respondent followed just that course, the Attorney General
refused to distribute the appropriation, claiming the courts
had to decide Mr. Hulbert's entitlement.

Such internally

inconsistent arguments underscore his real opposition to payment:
he just doesn't like the idea.

It should require little

argument to support the proposition that the Attorney General's
personal views on the relative merit of legislative enactment
or appropriations should play no role in his duty to comply
with the law.

While the appellant's entire brief is couched
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taxpayers, the appellant has lost sight of the fact that the
legislature, the elected representatives of the taxpayers, is
the body constitutionally mandated to make judgments on the
wisdom of particular fiscal items, and by ignoring that fact the
Attorney General is overstepping the bounds of his office in the
exact fashion warned against in Wood v. Budge, supra.
The respondent respectfully submits that he has complied
with every conceivable requirement imposed by law in asserting
his claim against the State, and the legislature having lawfully
allocated a sum for paying that claim, this appeal should be
dismissed as the dispute between Mr. Hulbert and the State has
been resolved, and only that dispute is properly at issue.
CONCLUSION
The arguments raised by appellant in opposition to the
judgment entered below are all contrary to the established law
of this State.

The jurisdiction of the District Courts to

entertain claims against the State and to render judgment thereon
has been directly sustained by this Court and is an integral
part of Utah's present statutory procedure for presenting such
claims.

The issue of how such

judg~ents

might lawfully be

satisfied, while intriguing, has no bearing on the court's
jurisdiction and is not relevant to this appeal.
The judgment for reasonable attorney's fees entered below
is supported by the factual findings and the Conclusions of
Law based on those findings.

This Court has previously

sustained an award for fees based on a promise to pay for
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services where the recipient of those services otherwise
would have had no obligation to do so, and that holding, which

is controlling here, is consistent with the law and theory which
has developed at common law on the enforceability of promises
made for past services rendered.

This binding agreement between

the respondent and his counsel forms the basis of the "reasonable
attorney's fees necessarily incurred" for which Mr. Hulbert is
entitled to compensation, and the State's obligation is for the
amount so found.
There is not now, nor has there ever been, any per

~

constitutional restriction on the legislature's power to pass
retroactive measures, and the legislature is free to waive any
vested state interest attached to past actions.

The only

requirement the Constitution imposes on enactments granting
ne\v rights to an individual or to a class is that there be a
rational basis for the creation of such rights and for limiting
them to the individual or class.

In the instant matter, either

the State's interest in insuring that its own employees not
suffer unjustified financial ruin for performance of their
duties or the State's interest in remedying past injustices
inflicted on a citizen by agencies of the State government is
sufficient rationale to support the legislation.

The first

will sustain a general enactment and the latter a special law.
Whichever this Act is viewed as, it is still constitutionally
permissable.
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Finally, this appeal is presently moot because the
legislature has resolved Mr. Hulbert's claim through
appropriation.
For the reasons stated above, the respondent respectfully
submits that this appeal should be dismissed or denied.
DATED this

day of June, 1979.
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